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Altruistic parents, who differ in income, make financial transfers to their children, who differ 
in ability. The children invest in post-compulsory education, subject to an endogenous credit 
constraint, and taking policy as given. There are two policy tools: a subsidy to those who 
participate in education and a proportional income tax. Not all children participate; a larger 
subsidy encourages participation, and a larger income tax discourages it. The parents, prior to 
making transfers, vote on policy. A voting equilibrium, if it exists, is such that voters in the 
two tails of the income distribution support a reduction, while the “middle-class” supports an 
expansion, of the education subsidy. Public support of education is a policy with regressive 
elements as it entails, among other things, a redistribution from the poor to the middle-
earners. We characterise a local equilibrium analytically, verify its existence numerically, and 
finally perform a number of comparative statics exercises. 
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In the Western countries, the State has played a dominant role in the ﬁnancing, regulation and
provision of education for the past two centuries and a half, and despite the more recent calls
for a "rolling back" of the Welfare State, its presence remains strongly felt. It is also widely
recognised that understanding the educational process is key for addressing important issues
such as intergenerational mobility, growth and development, and income equality. The choices
made by the families for the education of their children must be based, among other things, on
the existing education policies, and in turn these policies react to the political orientation of the
families. In the present paper, we address this circular relationship with a political economy
model that investigates the political support for post-compulsory education.
There is a general perception that post-compulsory education policies are at least partially
regressive, redistributing income from the lower income groups to middle- and high income
groups (see e.g. Fernandez and Rogerson 1995). The present paper focuses mostly on this
redistributive issue, trying to disentangle its components. We argue that a more precise reading
is that public ﬁnancing of non-compulsory education tends to redistribute towards the midde-
earners both from the high- and the low-earners. Hence, it is has both a progressive and a
regressive element. This interpretation is consistent with the analysis oﬀered by most com-
mentators on recent political conﬂicts over education policy such as those over the tuition fees
increase introduced in England by the Labour government in 2006. It was clear at the time that
much of the resistance against such an increase came from the middle-class, not the citizens at
either tail of the income distribution. In the context of our model, this can be explained as
follows. A move in the direction of ﬁnancing public education through user fees rather than
general taxation will of course be unwelcome to the user themselves (among them the middle-
earners), but very welcome to the non-users (the low-earners) and to those users who carry a
disproportionately large share of the tax burden (the high-earners).
In order to build a model to address these issues, we ﬁr s th a v et on o t ean u m b e ro ff e a t u r e s
that distinguish post-compulsory education from basic education:
• in most Western countries, by the time an individual reaches post-compulsory education
she is old enough to make economic decisions; hence parents and children should reason-
ably be treated as separate individuals each with their own individual preferences;
• a key decision for a young individual is whether or not to participate in post-compulsory
2education; the individual has the option of leaving education at the minimum school
leaving age; moreover, in line with the stylized facts, the participation decision should be
related to parental income;
• young individuals may be ﬁnancially constrained with respect to post-compulsory edu-
cational choices, leading either to non-participation or to a downward bias in the chosen
quality/expenditure; parents can, however, ﬁnancially assist their children and hence mit-
igate any potential credit constraints.
We embed the above features in our model: the parents, who are altruistic, make ﬁnancial
transfers to the children who, in turn, decide whether or not to participate in post-compulsory
education and, if so, how much to spend. A standard way of incorporating credit constraints is
simply to assume that children cannot borrow against future income. We assume instead that
children can borrow any amount that they can credibly promise to repay. This has the eﬀect
that e.g. parental transfers and/or government subsidies can boost a child’s credit limit.
Prior to the children entering post-compulsory education, the parents vote on educational
policy. We assume that the government can observe only the participation decision, not how
much a child spends on education. An educational policy hence consists of a ﬁxed subsidy that
is received by any participating child, ﬁnanced via a proportional tax on income. Despite the
relative complexity of the model, the parents’ preferences over policy has a surprisingly simple
structure. Indeed, the modeling of parents and children as separate individuals linked via the
parents’ ﬁnancial transfers is key to this result: the assumptions imply that the parents are, in
the language of Becker, “eﬀective altruists”, implying that they have simple preferences deﬁned
over total family resources.
In line with Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) we ﬁnd that existence of a majority voting
equilibrium is not guaranteed. However, following the approach of Epple and Romano (1996a,b),
we can give necessary conditions that must be satisﬁed by any majority voting equilibrium.
Indeed, just as in the Epple and Romano approach, we ﬁnd that a political equilibrium, when
one exists, will typically be of an “ends-against-the-middle” type, where parents in both tails of
the income distribution want to reduce the tax/subsidy policy. However, the intuition for this
is quite diﬀerent from the Epple and Romano result. In the current contex the poor will oﬀer
less political support to a policy subsidising post-compulsory education since they participate
less frequently. The very rich would like to see the policy scaled back since they pay a large
tax price. The support for an expansion of the education subsidy comes primarily from the
3“middle-class”. So, in this sense, we have the progressive/regressive eﬀect we mentioned above:
redistribution ﬂows not only from the high-income but also from the low-income to the middle-
income individuals.
As is well-know, "ends-against-the-middle" equilibria pose existence problems. In order to
check the existence of the equilibrium and to investigate its main properties we use a numer-
ical example, adapting and simplifying a computational model calibrated to match some key
parameters of the UK economy that is developed in full by Anderberg (2008). We round oﬀ the
paper by performing a comparative statics exercise.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 depicts the model; Section 2 discusses the
political equilibrium; Section 4 summarises.
II The Model
Consider an economy populated by a large number of households, each made of a parent and
a child. The parents are distinguished by their earnings y;c h i l d r e nh a v ed i ﬀerent abilities θ.
Each household is identiﬁed by a (y,θ) pair; the parent observes her own earnings as well as her
child’s ability. Both variables are continuously distributed on the supports [y,y] (with y > 0)
and [θ,θ] (with θ > 0) and the number of households is normalised to unity,
RR
f(y,θ)dydθ =1 .
In line with the empirical literature (e.g. Mayer 1997 and Blau 1999), we allow y and θ
to be positively, but not perfectly, correlated. Parents are altruistic towards their oﬀspring:
each adult makes a transfer b to her child. The child decides whether or not to participate in
post-compulsory education. If she does participate she makes a decision about how much to
spend, z, on that education. Hence a child that attends education and spends z obtains the
ﬁnal income w(z,θ). The earnings function satisﬁes1
wz > 0; wθ > 0; wzz < 0; wθθ < 0; wzθ > 0.( 1 )
We assumed that the two inputs in the earnings function are complements, wzθ > 0;t h i sr e ﬂects
an idea that people with higher innate ability can proﬁt more from their own human capital
investments. For simplicity, we take it that a child that does not participate in education obtains
ﬁxed earnings w0 > 0.2
1Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
2In fact, this simpliﬁcation is extreme. The model would work as long as ability has a larger impact on the
earnings of those who acquire an education than on the earnings of those who don’t. In the numerical model
4The timing of the model is as follows. First the parents vote over policy, consisting of a
ﬁxed subsidy σ, conditioned on participation only, and a proportional income tax τ levied on
the parents’ income (we disregard any taxes on income that the children may face). Then each
parent makes a transfer b to her children. Finally, the child makes her decision about education.
The model is solved by backward induction.
The Investment in Education
Consider a child who has received a transfer b from her parent. She faces the decision of whether
or not to participate in post-compulsory education, and, if she decides to participate, how much
to invest. We start by exploring the latter decision and its consequences in terms of the child’s
ﬁnal resources.
If a child participates in education and invests the amount z, her ﬁnal resources will be
x = w(z,θ)−z +σ +b.I no r d e rt oﬁnance the investment z she will need to borrow z −σ −b;
assuming a zero interest rate, she will have to repay exactly this amount. A particular loan will
be available if and only if it is in the child’s interest to subsequently repay that loan. This in
turn hinges on the consequences of defaulting. Following Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002),
we assume that if a child defaults all her assets will be seized by the lender, and she will also
have to pay a penalty equal to a fraction γ ∈ (0,1) of her future earnings: ﬁnal resources for a
defaulter are thus (1 − γ)w(z,y). Hence a child will be able to borrow the amount z − σ − b
if and only if she is better oﬀ by not defaulting. i.e. w(z,θ) − z + σ + b ≥ (1 − γ)w(z,θ) or
simply
γw(z,θ) − z + σ + b ≥ 0. (2)
The objective of the child is to maximize her ﬁnal resources x. The child’s maximal ﬁnal
resources, conditional on participation, can then be written as
xp (σ + b,θ)=m a x
z (w(z,θ) − z + σ + b) s.t. (2) (3)
Note that σ and b enter as argument in x(·) in the form of the sum σ +b. Hence we can deﬁne
a ≡ σ + b as the child assets and write xp = xp (a,θ) and z(a,θ) as the solution to the above
problem. Letting μ denote the Lagrange multiplier (to be interpreted as the marginal value of
credit), the ﬁrst order condition can then be written as
(wz − 1) + μ(γwz − 1) = 0 (4)
below, we will relax the assumption that uneducated workers earn a ﬁxed income.




> 0; za =0 .( 5 )
Thus, the unconstrained child’s educational investment is increasing in her own ability; also,
neither the government grant nor the domestic transfer aﬀect the child’s optimal level of invest-
m e n t( i tm a y ,o fc o u r s e ,a ﬀect the child’s decision to participate).
If the constraint binds, the optimal investment satisﬁes the credit constraint (2) with equal-
ity, and can be obtained as an implicit solution to γw(z,θ) − z + a =0 . Note that we can
determine bounds on the marginal return to z a s( i )i tm u s tb et h a twz > 1 since the uncon-
strained investment is not available, and, (ii) it must be that γwz < 1 since a marginal increase
in the investment necessarily leads the credit constraint to be violated.3 Combining the two
inequalities yields that




Treating γw(z,θ) − z + a =0as an identity and using (6) and (1) we can sign the following
comparative statics in the constrained case
za =( 1− γwz)
−1 > 0 (7)
zθ = γwθ (1 − γwz)
−1 > 0 (8)
that is, if the child is credit constrained, then her investment is increasing in her initial assets
and in her ability (and thus tendentially in her parent’s income). Note that the constrained
investment is increasing in the child’s ability for any given transfer b. This implies that a high
ability child (tendentially, then, a child to a rich parent) can borrow more than a low ability
c h i l dg i v e nt h es a m et r a n s f e r ;t h er e a s o ni st h a tt he child’s innate ability will boost the child’s
earnings, which allows the credit to the child to be extended without violating the constraint.
For future use, we need a few results concerning the marginal value to the child of her initial
assets and of her innate ability:







aθ =0 ), and that of ability is positive. For constrained children, the marginal
value of assets exceeds unity, since it also has the eﬀect of relaxing the credit constraint, and
3The constraint’s derivative w.r.t. z is γwz − 1; the constraint has a positive intercept (a) and to be binding
it must cross the abscyssa from above, hence γwz < 1.
6is decreasing, since the marginal value of credit μ decreases as initial assets increase; that of
ability is positive. Formally:
xp
a =1+μ ≥ 1; x
p
θ = wθ (1 + γμ) ≥ wθ > 0. (9)
and, for constrained children,
xp
aa = μa < 0; x
p
aθ = μθ. (10)
Proof. See the Appendix.
This completes the description of the child’d educational investment given that she has
decided to enroll in further education. Before characterizing the child’s participation choice we
need to consider the parent’s decision on the transfer b.
The Parent’s Transfer Decision
We assume that all parents make “interior” (strictly positive) transfers. This will imply that
the parents are, in Beckerian parlance, "eﬀective altruists", a fact that has strong implications
for the structure of their indirect utilities. The parent cares about her own consumption and the
child’s ﬁnal resources, and makes a transfer to the child, taking policy as given. For simplicity,
we let the parents’ utility be additively separable.
For a participating family, we can write U (b,y,θ;τ,σ)=u((1 − τ)y − b)+v(xp (σ + b,θ)),
with u(·) and v(·) strictly concave. The optimal transfer bp (y,θ;τ,σ) will satisfy
−u0 + v0xp
a =0 ; (11)
(it is easy to check that the second order condition is satisﬁed). We are interested ﬁrst in
determing how the transfer varies with the parent’s earnings. We expect that richer parents
make larger transfers (everything else, and in particular child’s ability, being equal), and in fact:
bp
y = −
−u00 (1 − τ)







Second, we want to investigate the role of the child’s ability; a standard result is that altruistic
parents compensate for the children’s failures, hence transfers should be decreasing in the child’s


















7The second term at the numerator, v0x
p
aθ, equals zero for unconstrained children, see the dis-
cussion of (10) above; then, b
p
θ < 0 by concavity of v(·) and (9). Thus, the standard result is
conﬁrmed for unconstrained children. For constrained ones, the eﬀect remains ambiguous as the
term v0x
p
aθ cannot be signed; on the one hand, the parent do try and compensate for reduced
ability, but they have also to account for the fact that changes in θ aﬀect the child’s capability
to obtain a loan. Hence, we have:
Lemma 2 The parental transfer is increasing in the parent’s earnings for all participating fam-
ilies; it is decreasing in the child’s ability for unconstrained families, but is ambiguously related
to the child’s ability for constrained families.



























σ| < 1 (15)
Intuitively, an increase in the tax rate aﬀects negatively the transfer due to an income eﬀect,
although an increase in the tax by 1% leads to a reduction in the trasfer of less than 1%, as
∂ (bp/y)/∂τ = b
p
τ/y ∈− (0,1). Also, increasing the education grant crowds out the domestic
transfer, although by less than one-for-one.
Finally, note that the parent’s problem can be rewritten using c ≡ (1 − τ)y−b and a = b+σ
to eliminate b.W et h u sh a v e :
V p ((1 − τ)y + σ;y,θ)=m a x
c,a {u(c)+v(xp (a,θ))|c + a =( 1− τ)y + σ} (16)
This is how the assumption of eﬀective altruism comes into play: conditional on the child
participating in education, the parent evaluates alternative policies only by how they aﬀect net
family resources, mp ≡ (1 − τ)y + σ.
In a non-participating family, the ﬁnal resources for the child will be xnp (b) ≡ w0 + b since
she is not eligible for the subsidy σ.W et h u sh a v eU (b;y,τ)=u((1 − τ)y − b)+v(w0 + b),
with ﬁrst order condition (both necessary and suﬃcient),
−u0 + v0 =0 (17)
We can now compute:
bnp
y =
u00 (1 − τ)
u00 + v00 > 0; bnp
τ = −
u00y
u00 + v00 < 0, (18)
8i.e. the transfer is increasing in parental income and decreasing in the income tax rate for
non-participating families. Note that the child’s earnings do not depend on her ability; hence,
the parental transfer is also independent from the child’s ability. Finally, writing the indirect
utility as
V np ((1 − τ)y)=m a x
c,b
{u(c)+v(w0 + b)|c + b =( 1− τ)y} (19)
shows that it can be written simply as a function of the parent’s net-of-tax income.
The Participation Choice
The participation choice formally rests with the child and the child can take this decision after
the parent has made the ﬁnancial transfer. Hence, we assume that the parent cannot condition
the transfer on the child’s education choice. The reason for this is that, if the child needs the
transfer to ﬁnance her investment, it must occur upfront, i.e. before the child implements her
education choice. It is however easy to see that there is no conﬂict between the parent and
the child, in general and speciﬁcally where the participation choice is concerned. Whatever
maximises the child’s resources also maximises the parent’s utility, as the latter cares for the
child’s objective. This has the useful implication that we can study the participation decision
from the point of view of the parent, because in equilibrium, the child will always make the
educational choice most preferred by the parent. This approach implies that we can analyse
a family’s participation choice using the parent’s indirect utility rather than focusing on the
child’s ﬁnal resources.
We establish ﬁrst a preliminary result. The result states that, if a family is indiﬀerent
between participating and not participating and if they are not credit constrained, then the
outcome for both the child and the parent is the same under each choice. In contrast, if a
family is indiﬀerent, but are credit constrained, then the parent enjoys higher own consumption
under non-participation while the child enjoys higher a higher net income under participation.
Lemma 3 Consider a family indiﬀerent between participating and not participating in education:
if the child is not credit constrained, both x and c are the same no matter whether the child
participates or not; if she is constrained, c is larger and x is smaller when non-participating
than when not participating.
Proof. See the Appendix.
9We can now show a number of results that characterise the participation choice, First, we
show that this choice is strictly monotonic in the child’s ability level within each parental income
class:
Proposition 4 Within any group of parents with the same income y,t h e r ee x i s t sac u t - o ﬀ
child’s ability level b θ(y) such that all parents whose children are of ability θ ≥ b θ(y) prefer them
to enter education, while all parents whose children are of ability θ<b θ(y) prefer them not to
enter education.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Strict monotonicity in the participation choice follows the fact that high-ability children
obtain a larger income from education than low-ability children at the same level of investment.
The cut-oﬀ level b θ(y) is in general also a function of policy. We can show that, predictably,
participation within each y- c l a s si sb o o s t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nσ, everything else being equal;
instead, an increase in τ, everything else being equal, will reduce participation within the y-class,
but only if the marginal family is credit constrained:
Proposition 5 Within any group of parents with the same income y,t h ec u t - o ﬀ child’s ability
level b θ is increasing in the subsidy σ, decreasing in the tax rate τ if the family is credit constraint
and unaﬀected by changes in τ otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The ﬁrst part follows because only participating families enjoy the education grant; the
second because participation becomes less attractive only if a family is credit constrained: if
the child attains the eﬃcient investment level, then there will be no income eﬀect of taxation.
It is also true that participation choice is weakly monotonic in parental income keeping θ
constant. However, note that this obtains if and only if there are binding credit constraints: if
there are no binding credit constraints, then the investment undertaken by a family (both in
terms of partipation and in terms of the level of investment in case of participation) is solely a
function of the child’s ability θ. When there are binding credit constraints, there will generally
be a set of ability types for which the participation decision (and investment level) depends
positively on family income.
10III On the Political Equilibrium
A parent’s indirect utility, taking into account the endogenous participation choice, is
V (σ,τ;y,θ)=m a x{V p ((1 − τ)y + σ,y,θ),Vnp ((1 − τ)y)} (20)





for a non-participating family, there is no way in which an increase in σ can compensate an
increase in τ, since they are not entitled to the grant. Note that for each family we can
identify, in the (τ,σ)-space, a locus along which the family is indiﬀerent between participating
and not participating; this is the locus of all (τ,σ) pairs such that V p ((1 − τ)y + σ,y,θ)=
V np ((1 − τ)y,θ), as we know that the child’s choice agrees with that of the parent. Note that
an increase in σ, everything else being the same, will trivially break the indiﬀerence in favour
of participation; hence, all policies ”above” the indiﬀerence locus will determine participation,
and all policies ”below” the locus will determine non-participation.4
The above formulation makes it easy to see that a typical indiﬀerence curve is vertical below
the family’s participation locus and has slope y above the locus (importantly, children’s ability
does not aﬀect policy preferences; the marginal rate of substitution between policy instruments
only depends on y).
Preferences over Policy
The revenue constraint can be written, in per-capita terms, as
τya − σQ(τ,σ)=0 , (22)
where ya is average income and Q(·) is the total share of the population participating in post-
compulsory education. This can be seen as implicitly deﬁning e.g. σ as a function of τ.F o r
the ideal policy problem (conditional on participation) to be well-behaved, we need the revenue
curve in the (τ,σ)-space to be strictly concave. Intuitively, we expext this to be the case: as
the tax rate grows, so does the budget-balancing grant, but at a decreasing pace, because more
and more people are entitled to it — aggregate participation increases with σ, as can be inferred
by (A13). At the present level of generality, we can however only prove the following:
4It is also possible to show that the locus is ﬂat as long as the family is unconstrained, and positively sloped
when it becomes constrained.
11Proposition 6 The revenue curve in the (τ,σ)-space is increasing,
σ0 (τ) > 0. (23)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Strict concavity will have to be conﬁrmed numerically; for now, we simply assume it.
Using the revenue constraint to eliminate one policy tool, we may rewrite the indirect utility
functions of participating and non-participating families as follows:
V p (τ;y)=u((1 − τ)y − b)+v(xp (σ(τ)+b,y)); (24)
V np (y;τ)=u((1 − τ)y − b)+v(x0 + b), (25)
where in both cases it is understood that b is chosen optimally. The derivatives w.r.t. τ are:
V p
τ = −yu0 + v0xp
aσ0; V np
τ = −yu0. (26)
For families outside education, it is immediate to see that the preferred policy is no policy at
all: they only lose from an income tax liability that gives them noting in return. For these
families, the highest attainable indiﬀerence curve is the one through the origin — the revenue
curve is all below such indiﬀerence curve. For participating families, the ideal tax rate satisﬁes,
using that u0 = v0x
p
a by (11):
y = σ0. (27)
The indiﬀerence curve is tangent to the revenue curve somewhere along the former’s positively
sloped tract. Note that it does not make a diﬀerence for the policy preferences whether a family
is credit-constrained or not as long as it is participating in education: credit constraints only
aﬀect a family’s policy preferences in so far as it aﬀects the participation decision. The ideal
tax rate has then the standard interpretation of being the tax rate that equates the MRS with
the slope of the revenue curve.
The Ideal Policy as a Function of Income
If concavity of σ(·) holds the following “algorithm” can be used to obtain the ideal policy for
each family (θ,y) given that the budget set is concave (over the relevant region): (i) ﬁnd the
policy that maximizes the participation utility V p ((1 − τ)y + σ,y,θ) over the budget set σ(τ)
using the ﬁrst order condition σ0 (τ) ≤ y with complementary slackness (i.e. [σ0 (τ) − y]τ =0 );
this ideal policy trivially only depends on y (not on θ). Then, (ii) compare the “participation
12utility” at this policy to the “non-participation” utility at laissez-faire V np (y) (since the ideal
policy under non-participation is always τ = σ =0 ).
Note that there will be a group of families for whom y ≥ σ0(0); these families will favour
the laissez-faire policy both under participation and under non-participation. This is because,
even when they participate, the subsidy they receive is simply not enough to compensate the
t a x e st h e yp a y .H e n c e ,a n yf a m i l yw i t hi n c o m ey ≥ y◦,w h e r ey◦ ≡ σ0 (0), will have the ideal
policy τ = σ =0 . Note that all these families have incomes above the average: evaluating (23)





where Q(0,0) is the participation in laissez-faire.S i n c e Q(0,0) is in the interval (0,1),t h e n
yo >y a.
For families with income below y◦, refer to the above algorithm, and think about part (i)
as generating a “participating” ideal tax τp (y) (which is a well-behaved decreasing function in
y) and part (ii) as generating a “non-participating” ideal tax τnp (y) (which is trivially zero).





τp (y) ≥ 0 if V p (τp (y),y,θ) ≥ V np (τnp (y),y,θ)
τnp (y)=0 if V p (τp (y),y,θ) <Vnp (τnp (y),y,θ)
(29)
Again, it should be stressed that ability only aﬀects the family’s ideal policy through its eﬀect
on the participation decision.
Necessary Conditions for Local Equilibria
We now discuss political equilibria under majority voting. For the purpose of such a discussion,
we postulate that all parents attend elections; in the numerical example below, we relax this
assumption.
Voting is over τ,w i t hσ implicitly deﬁned through the budget constraint; we refer to τ∗ as the
equilibrium tax rate, and to σ∗ = σ(τ∗) as the equilibrium, budget-balancing, subsidy. Given
the nature of the policy preferences, and the way they vary with income, it is diﬃcult to make
general statements. We cannot invoke neither single-peakedness nor single-crossing, and hence
the median voter theorem does not apply. Another diﬃculty is that ”large” policy changes (i.e.
non-marginal changes) induce a correspondingly ”large” change in participation. This implies
possibly complex voting behaviour: for example, a typical reaction for a parent would be that
if a given tax-subsidy pair that induces non-participation is taken as a starting point, she will
13certainly oppose a marginal expansion of policy but may well favour a non-marginal one that
makes her jump out of the non-participation area.
With this in mind, we proceed in our discussion focusing on ”small” policy changes and
local equilibria. We distinguish between a trivial equilibrium, in which the implemented policy
is in fact the laissez-faire, τ∗ = σ∗ =0 , and a non-trivial one in which τ∗ > 0 and σ∗ > 0.
There are two possibilities:
1. If more than half the population have a laissez-faire (τ = σ =0 ) as their ideal policy, this
is trivially a majority voting equilibrium. The group of families who have laissez-faire as
their ideal policy may be diverse, consisting both of families with children with low ability
and families with high income (y ≥ yo).
2. A suﬃcient condition for laissez-faire not to be a majority voting equilibrium is that the
fraction of families that (i) participate in education at laissez-faire and (ii) have y<y o
exceeds 1/2. All families in that satisfy (i) and (ii) would favour the introduction of a
subsidy policy, thus ruling laissez-faire out as an equilibrium.
Let us imagine that voting is over marginal reforms, and that a reform only wins if it










, there will be support for a marginal policy expansion for all families
who are participating at
¡
τk,σk¢
and who have incomes below yk; in contrast, support for a




incomes above yk. Hence for
¡
τk,σk¢
to be a majority voting equilibrium, neither group must
be a majority — i.e. the two groups must be of equal size. If yk is such that the population is
partitioned in the way described above, then
¡
τk,σk¢
is a local equilibrium in the sense that it
will beat all marginal reforms.
AN u m e r i c a lM o d e l
In order to check the existence (and other properties) of the equilibrium we employ a numerical
example. Rather than assigning parameter values arbitrarily, we use those identiﬁed by Ander-
berg (2008), who has calibrated the theoretical model of the present paper to match key features
of the UK economy. Details on the procedures for obtaining values of the more immediately
14salient features of the model are available in Anderberg (2008). Here, we simply state the most
relevant pieces of information, and the functional forms used.
The aggregate rate of staying on in education past the compulsory age of sixteen in the UK
is slightly above 71 percent.5 However, this aggregate value hides signiﬁcant diﬀerence across
income groups, as participation rates (as well as educational attainment) is known to vary posi-
tively with income (see e.g. Blanden et al., 2003). The calibrated model uses four participation
rates, corresponding to the quartiles of an estimated long-run family income distribution: the
rates are 60, 65, 76,a n d85 percent respectively. In the computation, the aggregate participa-
tion rate (72) and the participation gap between the top and the bottom income quartile (25
percentage points) are replicated.
The relationship between parental earnings and children’s abilities is represented using a
simple regression-to-the-mean formulation,
ln(a)=C + kln(y)+ε, (30)





and independent of y. Since the scale of ability is not observed, C is
set so as to normalize log ability to have unit mean; this leaves k and σ2
ε to be determined. To
simplify this step, the correlation between parental income and child ability, is estimated, and
is found to be in the range of 0.24 to 0.28. Hence, in the model, a correlation between (log)
ability and (log) parental income in this range is imposed. Given the variance of (log) parental
income σ2
y this imposes a relationship between k and σ2
ε and leaves one of these variable to be
assigned a value (see below).
One of the basic tenets of the present paper is that children might be discouraged from
participating in post-compulsory education due to ﬁnancial constraints. Using an approach
originally developed by Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Anderberg (2008) and Dearden et al.
(2004) use UK data6 in order to provide an estimate of the number of children who are discour-
aged from participating due to ﬁnancial constraints. The resulting estimates go from of 1-1.2%
to 5-7%; the model is calibrated to match the low range of estimates.
As mentioned, in the numerical model we relax the assumption that everybody votes. Using
data from the National Child Development Study (a survey similar to the BCS, but following
5Department for Education and Skills, SRF 03/2005.
6The data are from the British Cohort Survey (BCS). The BCS originally collected information about all
c h i l d r e nb o r ni nt h eU Ki no n es p e c i ﬁc week in 1970. The study has subsequently carried out follow-up surveys
on health, education, family and social inﬂuences at various ages (5, 10, 16, 26, and 30).
15a cohort born 12 years earlier) on the 1997 UK general election, Anderberg (2008) ﬁnds that
the average voting frequency was 78 percent and that someone at the top of the distribution is
about 30 percentage points more likely to vote than someone at the bottom.
The relevant income concept is the parents’ lifetime income (there being no subperiods in the
model). Dearden et al. (2006) provide estimates of lifetime income distributions for graduates
and non-graduates by gender in the UK. Aggregating their results (at one percent discount
rate) yields that the mean is about £700’ with a standard deviation of log lifetime income of
0.43. The model is calibrated to match these moments.





In order to assign a value to the altruism parameter λ, information on parental transfers from
the BCS data is used. Among those who left education by age 16, close to 70% of kids reported
having received ﬁnancial support from their parents, including help with accommodation (55%
without accomodation). For the risk aversion parameter, ρ is set to 1.5, which is within the
standard range frequently used in the literature.
The model is calibrated to match the average spending on education in terms of its two main
components: public expenditure and foregone earnings. Using information on public spending
per student per year in further- and higher education respectively and information about the
distribution of the years of further study among those staying on past 16 the estimated average
total public spending per student staying onis around £14’.7 BCS data allow to estimate average
forgone earnings per student staying on at about £30’. Adding direct costs of participation (e.g.
tuition fees), average total private investments is estimated to be £35’.
Human capital accumulation technology is given by a standard log-linear speciﬁcation:
w(z,a)=ηzαaβ, (32)
where α is the elasticity of earnings with respect to the investment z and β is the elasticity with
respect to ability. As mentioned, in the calibrated model ability inﬂuences also the unskilled
earnings:
w0 (a)=η0aβ0, (33)
7Information on spending per student is obtained from the National Statistics Bulletin “Statistics of Education:
Education and Training Expenditure Since 1992-93” Issue No 06/02, September 2002, Table 8. The distribution












Table 1: Parameter values in the baseline calibration
where β0 is the elasticity of unskilled earnings with respect to ability.
Nine parameters were obtained by calibrating the model to nine of the stylized facts described
above. The “earnings monitoring” parameter γ was set so that the model matches the fraction
of families estimated to be credit constrained; the altruism parameter λ was set to match the
frequency of parental transfers; the ability transmission parameter k was set so as to match
the observed correlation between parental income and child ability; the remaining calibrated
parameters, α, β, β0, η, η0 and σ2
ε, were chosen to match the public spending per participating
child, average private investments, mean income, the variance of log income, the aggregate
participation rate, the participation gap between the top and the bottom income quartile. The
calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 1.8
Existence of a Political Equilibrium
Our ﬁrst concern is whether we can ﬁnd a majority voting equilibrium that ﬁts the data.
Analytically, we provided conditions for local equilibria; numerically, we can check whether a
local equilibrium is also a global one. The calculation proceeds as follows. Starting from an
initial income distribution for parents, one has to:
1. characterize individual family behavior at all policies and determine and the government
8Formally, the income distribution is also endogenized; in the equilibrium presented, the economy is in steady
state in the sense that the income distribution for the children is the same as that for the parents (i.e. it is
stationary). See Anderberg (2008) for further details.






























Figure 1: The government budget constraint
budget constraint, σ(τ), that is consistent with optimal family behavior;
2. compute the political support for a marginal policy expansion at each policy on the gov-
ernment budget constraint and locate a policy (τ∗,σ∗) where this support is equal to
1/2;
3. put (τ∗,σ∗) to a global test, checking if it is preferred by a majority against all other
policies along the government budget constraint;
It will be recalled that we could not show analytically that the budget constraint is concave;
we however provided an intuitive argument supporting the view that it should be so. The
numerical example conﬁrms the argument: since a more generous education subsidy encourages
participation, the constraint is indeed concave (Figure 1 illustrates). The support for a marginal
policy expansion comes from those families who participate and have y ≤ σ0 (τ):a si th a p p e n s ,
there is one policy where the support for a marginal policy expansion is equal to 1/2, namely
τ∗ =0 .015 and σ∗ =1 4 .2. This policy then qualiﬁes as a local equilibrium. Figure 2 further
shows that the support for this candidate policy against all other feasible alternatives always
stays above 0.5; then, we conclude that the policy is also a global equilibrium.
As a check on the meaningfulness of the whole exercise, it bears verifying the extent to which
the model is capable of replicatying the stylised fact on the basis of which it was calibrated.








































Figure 2: Political support for the winning policy
Table 2 reports the main outcomes of the simulation, and shows that it has worked satisfactorily
in this respect. Finally, it is worth remarking that a key simulation outcome (not reported here)
was not calibrated: this is the degree of intergenerational social mobility, commonly measured
using regressions of log parental earnings or income on the corresponding outcome for the child.
Computing this statistic on the simulated data shows that model outcome is well in line with
the estimates of 0.4-0.6 for the UK provided in the literature (Dearden et al 1997, Blanden et
al 2004) — see Anderberg (2008) for details.
Comparative Statics
Finally, we present the comparative statics of the political equilibrium with respect to some of
the parameters of the model. For ease of comparison results are reported in elasticity form by
considering a one percent increase in each parameter on a selected number of outcomes. The
results are presented in Table 3.
Consider ﬁrst α — the elasticity of skilled earnings with respect to investment. An increase
in α makes participating more attractive. This in turn increases the political support for policy.
It also makes investing more attractive. The positive impact on the average investment is fairly
small in part due to the fact that new participants make relatively small investments. There is
a large negative impact on the fraction of children who are credit constrained. This large eﬀect
19Investment levels Average total z 49
Average private b z 35
Policy Tax rate τ (%) 1.5
Public subsidy σ 14
Participation rates 1st income quartile (%) 58
2nd income quartile (%) 71
3rd income quartile (%) 77
4th income quartile (%) 83
Lifetime income Mean 700
S t .d e v .o fl o gi n c o m e 0.43
Transfers Positive transf.: participants (%) 20
Positive transf.: non-participants (%) 68
“Credit tightness” Fraction families constrained (%) 1.1
Intergen. links Correlation: parental income/ability 0.24
Table 2: Participation rates and investments at the policy equilibrium
reﬂect the small initial base.
Consider then β — the elasticity of skilled earnings with respect to ability. An increase in this
parameter also makes participating more attractive. The positive impact on participation also
leads to more political support for policy. However, a higher return to ability does not directly
make investing more attractive; indeed due to the new participants making low investments, the
overall impact on average investment is a small negative eﬀect. As in the case of α there is also
a large eﬀect on the fraction credit constrained. Hence the main eﬀects are on participation,
the level of policy and on the fraction of credit constrained agents.
An increase in β0 makes participation less attractive. This in turn erodes the support for
policy. The positive eﬀect on the average investment obtains since those now not participating
in education were making relatively small investments.
An increase in the transmission of ability k has a negligible eﬀect on policy and the aggregate
participation rate; its largest eﬀects are on the participation gap which increases due to average
ability having a larger income gradient. It slightly reduces the fraction of children who are
credit constrained which may seem unintuitive; this happens however because it reduces the
participation rate in the bottom income quartile. An increase in the variance of ability shocks
20Comparative Static α β β0 k σ2
ε λ ρ
Policy Tax rate τ (%) 3.4 9.8 −9.7 −0.5 −0.4 1.7 0.1
Spending σ 2.1 8.1 −7.3 −0.4 −0.0 1.6 0.1
Participation Agg. participation rate 1.7 2.9 −2.4 −0.1 −0.2 0.6 0.0
Participation gap (%) −1.7 −3.5 6.5 0.8 −0.1 −2.6 0.0
Investment/ Average total z 0.6 −0.3 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0
Income Average income 0.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1
S t .d e v .o fl o gi n c o m e 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 −0.5 −0.1
Credit Constrained (%) −17.7 −20.3 13.3 −3.6 −2.6 −16.8 0.9
Transfers Transfer Freq. 1.0 2.0 −1.8 −0.1 0 1.6 0.1
Table 3: Comparative statics on the policy equilibrium in elasticity form.
σ2
ε also has a negligible eﬀect on policy and the aggregate participation rate. By increasing the
ability spread it also increases the income variance.
An increase in altruism λ increases parental transfers and reduces the fraction of kids who are
credit constrained. This also increases the participation rate which in turn generates support
for policy expansion. Finally,a ni n c r e a s er i s ka v e r s i o nρ also implies that parents are more
inequality averse between themselves and their children. This generates a small increase in
transfers. However, in general, the outcome is not very sensitive to this parameter.
IV Summary
The present analysis has been motivated by the need to understand political conﬂicts around
education policy like the one raging in England prior to the tuition fees increase in 2006. It has
been observed by commentators at the time that while an increase in tutition fees was vehe-
mently opposed by the representatives of the middle-class, it seemed not to rise any comparable
concern among the less well-oﬀ , as well as in the rich segment of the population.
In fact, the behaviour of the latter was to be expected as they will beneﬁtt h em o s tf r o ma n y
corresponding reduction in taxation. A moment of reﬂection will however reveal that also the
behaviour of the low-earners makes perfect economic sense: due to a positive income gradient
in participation, low earning families less frequently beneﬁt from subsides to post-compulsory
education and would hence also favour the introduction of use fees and a corresponding tax
21reduction.
In order to understand theoretically situations like the one presented above, we developed
a model in which altruistic parents diﬀering by their income level make ﬁnancial transfers to
their children, diﬀering in cognitive abilities. The children are suﬃciently autonomous to take
decisions regarding their investments in post-compulsory education; however, the altruistic link
between generation ensures that whatever is optimal for the child is optimal for the parents as
well. These investment choices might be endogenously credit-constrained: lenders are supposed
to be able to monitor the child’s incentives to repay the loan and therefore will only lend
amounts that the child can credibly promise to repay. The children’s decisions are, among
other things, aﬀected by policy. The latter consists of a subsidy to those who enter higher
education, ﬁnanced by a proportional income tax on the parents. We note that not all the
children decide to participate in the education policy, that an increase in the tax rate, everything
else being equal, will reduce participation within the credit constrained groups, but not for the
unconstrained, and that an increase in the subsidy, everything else being equal, will trivially
boost participation.
The parents, prior to making transfers, vote over subsidies to those who participate in
education, ﬁnanced by a proportional tax on income. A voting equilibrium, if it exists, will be
such that voters in the two tails of the income distribution support a reduction in the education
subsidy: the reason is that the “poor” have a low participation rate, while the “rich” pay
a particularly high tax price. The support for an expansion of the education subsidy comes
primarily from the “middle-class”. An education policy has therefore a regressive element in
that low-income agents ﬁnance a form of public expenditure whose fruits are enjoyed mostly
by the middle-earners. This conclusion is prefectly consistent with the intutitive analysis of the
tuition fees conﬂi c tt h a tw er e p o r t e da b o v e .
Of course, "ends-against-the-middle" equilibria do not always exist. We ﬁrst provide a
necessary condition that has to be satisﬁed by an interior local equilibrium. We then verify
the existence of such an equilibrium in a numerical version of the model, and check succesfully
that the equibrium is also global. Finally, we perform a number of comparative statics exercises
tracing the eﬀect on the winning policy as well as other outcomes such as participation and
intergenerational social mobility.
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Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .W e ﬁrst consider the behaviour of the return to educational spending
as the child’s own ability changes. In equilibrium, we write wz(z(a,θ),θ) to emphasize that θ
aﬀects wz through the optimal educational investment as well as directly. The total derivative
of wz w.r.t. θ is
dwz
dθ
= wzzzθ + wzθ. (A1)
Using (5), we ﬁnd that (A1) equals zero for unconstrained families. (This is natural since the
unconstrained solution satisﬁes wz =1as identity). For constrained families instead, it is
23positive only if there is enough complementarity between z and θ to overcome the eﬀect of the
decreasing returns of z (|wzzzθ| <w zθ), and negative (or zero) otherwise. We proceed now by
solving the ﬁrst order condition (4) for the multiplier μ, that can be viewed as the marginal
value of credit. This yields
μ(a,θ)=
1 − wz (z(a,θ),θ)
γwz (z(a,θ),θ) − 1
≥ 0, (A2)
where it is emphasized that the ﬁrst order condition is evaluated at the optimal (unconstrained
or constrained) value of z.T r i v i a l l yμ =0if the choice is unconstrained, i.e. wz (·)=1 .O nt h e
other hand, μ>0 by (6) if the choice is constrained. Focusing on this case and diﬀerentiating






(1 + γμ)(wzzzθ + wzθ)
(1 − γwθ)
. (A4)
For constrained children, we have that μa < 0 by (6), (A2), (7) and (1); intuitively, the value of
credit will decrease as the child’s assets go up. As for μθ, the sign depends on the sign of (A1)
for constrained families — see above. For example, the value of credit for constrained children
will increase in parental income (μθ > 0) if complementarity in the earnings function is strong
enough, as it induces the child to want to match hew own higher ability by spending more on
her own education.
We can now recover an expression for the marginal value of the child’s assets. Applying the
envelope theorem yields that:
xp
a =1+μ ≥ 1 > 0; x
p
θ = wθ (1 + γμ) ≥ wθ > 0. (A5)
Furthermore, (9), (A3) and (A4) allow us to write9
xp
aa = μa < 0; x
p
aθ = μθ. (A6)
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .L e t(b cp,b xp) and (b cnp, b xnp) denote an indiﬀerent family’s allocation under
participation and non-participation respectively. We then write c V p = u(b cp)+v(b xp) and d V np =
u(b cnp)+v(b xnp) for the utility functions when participating and non-participating respectively;












By construction (b cp,b xp) and (b cnp, b xnp) both belong to the locus π w h i c hi sd o w n w a r ds l o p i n g .
We can now show that (b cp,b xp) lies to the “north-east” of (b cnp,b xnp) i ft h ec r e d i tc o n s t r a i n tb i n d s
on the indiﬀerent family and they coincide if the credit constraint is slack. To see this note








If the credit constraint binds, x
p
a > 1 by (9) and then it follows from (A8) and from c V p = d V np
that b cp < b cnp while b xp > b xnp. If the credit constraint is slack, xa =1and (b cp,b xp) and (b cnp,b xnp)
coincide.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .A parent will prefer the child to attend education if
V p ((1 − τ)y + σ;y,θ) ≥ V np ((1 − τ)y) (A9)
If V p increases faster in θ than V np at b θ (i.e. when V p = V np)i tf o l l o w st h a tV p will only ever
cut V np from below in the (θ,V) space and the result follows.
Applying the envelope theorem on (16) and on (19) yields (note that this refers to the total
derivative of the indirect utility w.r.t. child’s ability)
V
p
θ = v0 (xp)x
p
θ > 0; V
np
θ =0 , (A10)







θ=e θ > 0 (A11)
for a parent who is indiﬀerent within each income class.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 .We can implicitly diﬀerentiate V p
³
(1 − τ) b y + σ;y,b θ
´
−V np ((1 − τ)y)=
0; then since for the critical family, V
p
τ = −u0 (b cp)y and V
np
τ = −u0 (b cnp)y,w eh a v et h a t
b θτ = −

















where the signs follow from Lemma 3 and from (9).





be the fraction of participating families within a given y-class. Note that, by the Leibniz rule,









where the signs follow from (A12) and (A13) and the interpretation is obvious. The total share













where the signs follow from (A15). Using the government budget constraint (22) and applying





where we used (A17) to arrive at the sign.
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